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Rethinking Mistake in the Age 
of Algorithms 
Vincent Ooi- Singapore Management University;  
Soh Kian Peng- Singapore Management University 
 
-- In our previous note: Cryptocurrencies and Code before the Courts ((2019) 
30(3) King’s Law Journal 331 - 337), we discussed the Singapore International 
Commercial Court (High Court)’s decision in B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd. The case 
subsequently went on appeal, and the Singapore International Commercial Court 
(Court of Appeal), by a majority, affirmed the decision of the lower court in Quoine 
v B2C2 (“Quoine”). The case of Quoine represents the first time an apex court in the 
Commonwealth has ruled on the applicability of contractual principles to situations 
involving automated trading software. In our recent case note: Rethinking Mistake 
in the Age of Algorithms (forthcoming in the King’s Law Journal), we examine the 
decision in Quoine and argue that given that finding actual or constructive 
knowledge of an error necessary to invoke the doctrine of unilateral mistake may 
well be impossible in cases involving contracts formed by certain types of automated 
software, the approach set out by Lord Mance, who penned the dissenting judgment, 
may provide a viable solution. 
 
To provide a brief recount of the facts, central to the dispute were several trades 
executed between B2C2 Ltd (the “Respondent”) and the counterparties on the 
trading Platform operated by Quoine Pte Ltd (the “Appellant”). These trades were 
all executed via automated trading algorithms. The counterparties and the Appellant 
were unaware as to the specific terms on which the contracts were concluded. To 
place an order on the exchange, the Respondent’s algorithm first had to generate an 
“output price”. The generation was done by first obtaining data of the 20 best sell or 
buy orders from the Platform’s order book, being one of the variables for the series 
of trading strategies contained within the Respondent’s algorithm. Without data 
from the Platform, the Respondent’s algorithm would cease to work. Seeking to pre-
empt this, Mr Boonen, a director of the Respondent, inserted a “virtual price” of 10 
BTC to 1 ETH for sell orders for ETH. The “virtual price” would apply if there was 
no or insufficient input from the Platform, enabling the Respondent’s algorithm to 
continue running.  
 
As things transpired, this was exactly what happened. Because of an oversight, the 
Appellant’s market-making program could not access external market prices from 
other exchanges. ETH/BTC orders were not created on the Platform. However, 
because no error message was generated, this went unnoticed. Trading on the 
Platform fell to abnormally thin levels. This triggered margin calls on the 
Counterparties’ accounts. Consequently, market orders were placed on their behalf 
to buy ETH at the best available market price which happened to be that offered by 
the Respondent.  
 
Because the Platform was not configured to check whether the Counterparties had 
sufficient funds in their account, the Counterparties were allowed to trade more BTC 
than they had in their account, and at abnormally high prices. The Appellant reversed 
these trades on grounds that they represented an abnormal deviation from the 
previous BTC/ETH rate. The Respondent sued the Appellant for (a) breach of 
contract, alleging that they had no right to unilaterally reverse the trades and (b) 
breach of trust, alleging that the Appellant had unilaterally removed BTC from its 
account after reversing the trades. 
 
Significantly, the majority defined the software employed by the Respondent as 
“deterministic”. Such software would “always produce precisely the same output 
given the same input” and did not have the capacity to develop its own responses to 
varying conditions. Moreover, both the majority, and Lord Mance agreed that the 
doctrine of unilateral mistake at equity was applicable, however, they differed on the 
manner of its application. For the majority, the key inquiry where the doctrine of 
unilateral mistake at equity was concerned was constructive knowledge. And in this 
case, the relevant knowledge was that of the programmer or person running the 
program, and it was to be assessed from the point of programming up to the point 
where the contract was formed. On the other hand, Lord Mance conceptualised 
unconscionability as the key inquiry where unilateral mistake in equity is concerned, 
in cases where constructive notice could not be shown. This notion of 
unconscionability formulated by Lord Mance would encompass the behaviour of the 
non-mistaken party after the mistake was discovered.  
 
While Quoine demonstrates that existing common law principles may be sufficiently 
flexible to tackle novel situations arising from the application of new technologies, 
Lord Mance’s dissent may chart a new path for the development of the law to deal 
with cases involving software that can adapt its own responses to varying conditions 
(i.e. Artificial Intelligence).  
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